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PREFACE 
The German case study is part of the project "Social Security, Family and Household in 
Aging Societies, " conducted at IIASA in collaboration with the Netherlands Interdisciplinary 
Demographic Institute (NIDI). Initially two country case studies were planned for Germany, 
one for each German state. Because of German unification in October 1990, it was decided 
to produce a common study, taking into account that the West German pension system as 
well as the economic system have been applied to East Germany. 
Working Papers related to the IIASA project are listed below: 
WP-90-22 Socio-Demographic Changes and the Pension Problem in Austria, by J.-P. 
Gonnot 
WP-90-15 Demographic, Social and Economic Aspects of the Pension Problem: Evidence 
from Twelve Countries, by J.-P. Gonnot 
WP-89-107 Pension Systems and Social Security Trends and National Characteristics, by 
J.-P. Gonnot and C. Prinz 
WP-89-34 Recent Trends in Living Arrangements in Fourteen Industrialized Countries, 
by J.-P. Gonnot and B. Vukovich 
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ABSTRACT 
A comparison of the demographic past of the two German states shows that, although some 
important similarities remained, some demographic patterns have had a diverging tendency, 
With respect to aging, this has resulted in a somewhat younger age structure and a slightly 
more favorable demographic reproduction for East Germany. The demographic aging of the 
German population will continue, which at the same time will challenge the pension system. 
Testing different possible solutions to the pension problem, including strong inmigration, 
showed that there is no sole demographic answer to the problem. Instead, a combination of 
different measures will perform best. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS ON SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY IN THE UNIFIED GERMANY 
German Case Study 
Notburga Ott,' Thomas B~tner' and Heint P. Galle? 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The study on "Demographic Changes and their Implications on Some Aspects of Social 
Security in the Unified Germany" is the German case study of the international project 
"Social Security, Family and Households in Aging Societies." It tries to keep a common 
framework for the comparative part of the project, such as a common set of data tables, 
scenario settings for (demographic) projections, etc. However, the German case study 
deviates to some extent because of the exceptional event of German unification which 
suddenly became a reality in 1990. Consequently, the former concept of two separate country 
case studies, one for each German state, had to be withdrawn. Instead, a common German 
case study has been prepared, giving a comparative nature to some of the chapters 
(demographic trends in the past, description of the former pension systems). 
For reasons of simplicity, the term 'Germany' is used to represent the united Germany 
although the correct name now is Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). West Germany or 
FRG is used to describe the former West German state, while East Germany or German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) refers to the second German state which ceased to exist in 
October 1990. 
1. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN POSTWAR GERMANY--COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF EAST AND WEST GERMANY 
1.1. Demographic Trends 
The demographic trends in the two German states are similar to most of the developed 
countries. In the GDR, however, they show some specific features, especially for fertility 
and nuptiality which often have been attributed to a specific combination of an East German 
lifestyle and GDR population policy. 
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Fertility 
As far as fertility is concerned, one might distinguish between three periods (see Figure 1): 
- The post-war baby boom period peaked in the mid-1960s, when Total Fertility Rates 
(TFR) increased up to about 2.5 in both East and West Germany. 
- Subsequently, fertility dropped below replacement level within a few years (between 
1966 and 1974 a decrease of about 40%). Surprisingly, until the mid-1970s the TFR 
in the GDR as well as the FRG showed quite a similar picture. 
- In 1976, different trends for the two countries emerged. In the GDR fertility rose 
temporarily, to a certain extent due to a package of social political measures 
implemented in 1976, and then declined smoothly in the early 1980s. In the FRG, the 
7'FR continued to decrease until 1985, reaching a minimum of 1.28 children per 
woman. In the second half of the 1980s East and West German fertility showed quite 
different trends, but resulted in a similar fertility level. At the end of the 1980s, the 
7'FR of the two German states were more similar to each other than in the preceding 
15 years. 
The two German states differ not only with respect to the level, but also to the age pattern 
of fertility. East German women have their children earlier than in the FRG. Although the 
mean age of childbearing in both countries has increased (FRG since the mid-1970s, GDR 
since 1980), the difference has been growing from 2.1 years in 1975 to about 3 years in 
1985, respectively. 
Calendar Years 
Figure 1: Total Fertility Rates, GDR and FRG, 1950 - 1989. 
In general, differences in level and age patterns of basic demographic processes between East 
and West Germany might be explained by social conditions and individual orientation specific 
to each country. In the GDR, the provision of a basic social security for all citizens, 
combined with an overall low income and limited opportunities for individual careers 
especially in young ages, as well as specific benefits and incentives for both young couples 
and lone-parent families, might have resulted in both early childbearing, including a high 
amount of children born out of wedlock, and early marriages. However, the extremely high 
illegitimacy ratio in East Germany does not seem to be the result of the policy measures of 
the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1950s a higher proportion of children born out of wedlock had 
already been observed in the GDR (see Figure 2). In the FRG, a trend towards higher 
illegitimacy in childbearing had also been observed, starting at the peak of the baby boom 
in the mid-1960s, but the trend was more modest than in the GDR. In the late 1980s in the 
FRG, about 10% of all births had been born out of wedlock, while about one-third of all 
children born in the GDR had been born to unmarried mothers. 
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Figure 2: Illegitimacy ratio, 1946 - 1989. 
Summarizing the facts on the rather different trends with respect to fertility, some 
assumptions about future trends can be made. It should be assumed that a fast trend towards 
West Geman age patterns of fertility will occur in the GDR. Delaying fertility to older age 
groups might also result in a tendency to a lower fertility level. In the FRG the process of 
postponing fertility to older age groups seems unfinished, which means both a further 
increase of the age specific fertility rates for older women, and a decrease for younger 
women. But, as a result, a slight increase in the West German TFR might be expected, 
which assumes that an increase in the older age groups overcompensates the fertility decline 
in younger age groups. As for Germany as a whole, it seems rather likely that it will remain 
a low fertility country for the next decade(s). (For more detailed assumptions about future 
trends, see Section 2.) 
Nuptiality also shows a very different picture for the former two German states, as well as 
some common features. While in the 1950s and early 1960s more similarities can be found, 
in the 1970s a diverging trend emerged. 
The trend of the mean age of first marriage corresponds to a certain extent to the trends in 
overall nuptiality common to the two countries (see Figure 3): one can find a 'golden age' 
of marriage in the 1950s and 1960s, with a decreasing mean age of (first) marriage; growing 
numbers of marriages in absolute and relative terms; and a period of stagnation and 
reversion. In the mid-1970s, a trend towards later marriages, shorter marriage durations, and 
increasing divorces can be observed (see Table 1). In the 1980s, growing fractions of people 
remained unmarried, and new living arrangements like cohabitation emerged. 
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Figure 3: Mean age at first marriage. 
Table 1 : Nuptiality statistics. 
While the general trend in the mean age of (first) marriage has been surprisingly similar, the 
level and the age patterns are different when comparing East and West Germany. 
Year 
1971 
1980 
1987 
The very young age pattern of fertility in the GDR corresponds with similar young age 
patterns for marriage and divorce, and vice versa for the FRG. The age patterns of nuptiality 
are significantly different in young age groups (before age 30), but surprisingly similar for 
older age groups (see Figures 4 and 5). 
Future trends for nuptiality are not easy to estimate. Two main tendencies seem to be 
probable: a change in East German age specific nuptiality patterns similar to those of West 
Germany, and a moderate tendency of further shifting the first marriages to older age groups 
(see Section 2). 
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Figure 4: First marriage 1985, age patterns. 
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Figure 5: Divorce 1985, age patterns. 
Mortalitv 
As in most European countries, life expectancy has increased remarkably in both East and 
West Germany, and the increase has been greater for women. Between 1950 and 1985 life 
expectancy of a newborn rose in West Germany by 7.3 years for males and by 9.9 years for 
females. 
The increase in life expectancy in East Germany was more moderate: 4.6 years for males and 
6 years for females. As a result, the FRG life expectancy for males in 1985 was 2.2 years, 
and for females 2.9 years higher, when compared with the GDR figures. Note that the 
differences between East and West Germany tend to decrease for higher ages (Tables 2 and 
3) 
Table 2: FRG mortality 1950 - 1985. 
Table 3: 
Age 
a t  b i r t h  
a t  age 60 
a t  age 80 
a t  b i r t h  
a t  age 60 
a t  age 80 
GDR mortality 1950 - 1985. 
L i f e  Expectancy 
( i n  years) 
1949/51 
Surv ivors  
(per 1000 born) 
Age 
a t  b i r t h  
a t  age 60 
a t  age 80 
a t  b i r t h  
a t  age 60 
a t  age 80 
a t  age 60 
a t  age 80 
a t  age 60 
a t  age 80 
L i f e  Expectancy 
1952/53 1960/61 1971/72 1980/81 1985/86 
Ma 1 es 
65.06 67.31 68.46 68.96 69.64 
15.99 15.95 15.35 15.58 15.87 
5.03 5.21 5.14 4.99 5.09 
Fema 1 es 
69.53 72.18 73.73 74.85 75.48 
17.68 18.51 18.43 18.95 19.23 
5.35 5.73 5.69 5.89 6.02 
Ha 1 es 
64.56 66.86 67.41 70.18 71.81 
16.20 15.49 15.31 16.51 17.26 
5.24 5.24 5.36 5.73 5.99 
Females 
68.48 72.39 73.83 76.85 78.37 
17.46 18.48 19.12 20.82 21.72 
5.57 5.85 6.16 7.46 6.98 
1960/62 
Ma 1 es 
729 767 777 81 0 833 
25 1 242 232 284 325 
Females 
802 85 5 869 899 914 
318 385 420 557 5 09 
Surv ivors  
(per 1000 born) 
1970/72 
a t  age 60 
a t  age 80 
a t  age 60 
a t  age 80 
Ma 1 es 
74 2 777 797 795 803 
247 263 236 244 260 
Fema 1 es 
808 852 874 887 895 
332 384 392 425 443 
1980/82 1985/87 
The post-active phase of a life cycle is--in terms of mortality--characterized by three major 
facts: 
- A large and still growing fraction of individuals survives to the last phase in the life 
cycle. More than 80% of a male cohort, but about 90% of a female cohort will 
survive to age 60. 
- The post-active period of the life cycle itself is of considerable duration and therefore 
importance. Sixty year-old males can expect to live another 16 (GDR) to 17 (FRG) 
years, whereas females will have another 19 (GDR) to 22 (FRG) years to live at that 
age. 
- As a result of the significant sex differentials of mortality over the whole life cycle, 
the sex ratio of the elderly is very much imbalanced. 
1.2. Internal and External Migration 
The origin and history of both East and West Germany were remarkably affected by 
significant migration flows, resulting in gains for West Germany and losses for East 
Germany: 
- tremendous outmigration from East Germany to West Germany (about 3.158 million), 
- continuous inmigration to West Germany by people of German nationality coming 
from eastern and southeastern Europe (about 2.0 million between 1950 and 1989), 
- inmigration of foreign workers and their families to West Germany, and, to a smaller 
amount, to East Germany, 
- inmigration of people seeking asylum for political reasons. 
Outmigration from East Germany to West Germany falls into two different periods (see Table 
4). Between 1950 and 196011961, more than 200,000 people left the GDR annually to re- 
settle in the FRG. This migration was 'clandestine,' that is, without permission from the 
GDR authorities, but because of the open borders, especially between East and West Berlin, 
movement was easy. The significant migration losses and their economic implications 
threatened the economic as well as political stability of the GDR. Until August 1961, about 
2.56 million people migrated from the GDR to the FRG, which is a tremendous number 
when compared with the 17.08 million inhabitants of the GDR at the end of 1961. The res- 
ponse was the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. 
Subsequently, the number of people migrating illegally from East to West Germany 
decreased drastically. Another consequence was that some legal emigration became possible: 
so-called family reunification on a legal basis. From 1962 to 1988 the majority of migrants 
from the GDR to the FRG left with permission. In total, from 1962 to 1988 about 560,000 
people left the GDR for the FRG, 68% legally. In 1989, a dramatically increased 
outmigration of 344,000 GDR citizens finally destabilized East Germany as a separate state. 
Unification of Germany became possible and was urgently demanded by a majority of East 
Germans. 
9 
Table 4: Total inmigration to West Germany, 1950 -1989. 
Source: Bundesausgleichsamt 
Year 
1950-59 
1960-69 
1970-79 
After unification of Germany on 3 October 1990, however, inmigration does not seem not 
to be finished at all. After having received 2.0 million people with German nationality or of 
German origin during the last four decades, the united Germany is likely to be entered by 
approximately another 2 million Germans still living in Eastern Europe until the turn of the 
century. 
In addition, the organized inmigration of foreigners into Germany was a decisive means to 
deal with the lack of labor force for both East and West Germany. Whereas in West 
Germany foreign workers were already employed in the 1950s, in East Germany the 
temporary inflow of foreign workers did not start before the 1970s. At the end of the 1980s, 
1.624 million foreign workers were registered in West Germany (1988), but only 94,600 in 
East Germany (end of 1989). The proportion of all foreigners to the resident population 
differs between East and West Germany from 1.2% (GDR 1989) to 6.8% (FRG 1987). Quite 
similar to the expected inflow of ethnic Germans, an end to inmigration of foreigners cannot 
be seen yet. Within the context of the East European political changes, as well as their 
economic difficulties during the transition to a market economy, an enormous migration 
potential can be identified in East Europe. 
1980-88 1 371 
Inmigration into Uest Germany ( i n  1000) 
1.3. Size and Age Structure of the Two Populations 
Total 
Between 1950 and 1985, the GDR population decreased from 18.4 million to 16.7 million, 
i.e. by 1.7 million (see Table 5). This might be regarded as a substantial amount in absolute 
terms, but it is surprisingly little when the migration loss of about 3.089 million at that time 
is taken into account. Between 1950 and 1985 the FRG population increased by 11.2 million 
people, i.e. by 12% (see Table 6). 
Despite its declining number of total population, East Germany shows a younger population 
in the late 1980s than the population of West Germany. This was the result of different 
population trends and their implications on the age composition of the population. 
1 960 2 643 2 203 440 - 683 
2 493 84 0 618 222 + 1 653 
1 8 2 8  504 149 355 + 1 324 
Foreigners Germans 
Total from 
East 
Germany 
from 
Eastern 
Europe 
10 
Table 5: GDR population by broad age groups. 
1990 estimated 
Table 6: FRG population by broad age groups. 
Year 
1990 estimated 
Percentage of t o t a l  
In the period under consideration, the proportions of broad age groups for both East and 
West Germany change, but do not show a linear trend at all. The percentage of people of 
working age (15 to 59) declined until the 1970s, but again increased until the mid-1980s in 
both countries. 
1950 4 202 11 214 2 972 18 388 
1960 3 678 10 013 3 497 17 188 
1970 3 970 9 334 3 764 17 068 
1980 3 271 10 261 3 208 16 740 
1985 3 202 10 390 3 058 16 650 
1990 3 253 10 020 2 939 16 212 
Total  
Year 
Until the 1970s, the proportion of old age people was higher in East Germany, against a 
background of an increase for both East and West Germany. In the 1980s the proportion of 
old age people continued to increase for the FRG, but decreased for the GDR. The same can 
be seen for the proportion of people below age 15. Until the 1970s, the proportion of 
children remained on a comparably high level, fluctuating around 22% of the total 
population. The proportion of people below age 15 later decreased significantly for the FRG 
(to 15% in 1990), and fell only slightly for the GDR (about 20% in 1990). 
0-14 60+ 0-14 
Percentage of t o t a l  
22.8 61.0 16.2 
21.4 58.3 20.3 
23.3 54.7 22.0 
19.5 61.3 19.2 
19.2 62.4 18.4 
20.1 61.8 18.1 
15-59 
1950 11 855 31 952 7 151 50 958 
1960 12066 34657 9235 55958 
1970 14 103 35 094 11 804 61 001 
1980 11 003 38 689 11 966 61 658 
1985 9 128 39 414 12 482 61 024 
1990 9336  39745 13111 62192 
Total  
15-59 
60+ 0-14 0-14 
23.3 62.7 14.0 
21.6 61.9 16.5 
23.1 57.5 19.4 
17.8 62.7 19.4 
15.0 64.6 20.5 
15.0 63.9 21.1 
15-59 
60+ 
15-59 60+ 
Total  
Total 
2. DEMOGRAPHIC SCENARIOS FOR GERMANY 
2.1. Estimating the Future: Transition Towards a Unified Germany 
In the project "Social Security, Family and Households in Aging Societies" a set of four 
standard scenarios have been defined for comparative reasons. These scenarios are: 
- Benchmark Scenario (BM) 
Keeps the observed average rates from 1980-85 constant for the whole projection 
period (e.g. 1985190 - 2050); 
- Western Scenario (WEST) 
Combines the most extreme demographic rates in western European countries 
observed in the period 1980 to 1985: West German low fertility (1.28 children per 
woman), Swedish nuptiality (one-third never married, mean age at first marriage of 
28 for women and 30 for men, one-third of all marriages ending in divorce); 
- Fertility Scenario (FER) 
Assumes fertility increase to replacement level, other rates are the same as the 
benchmark scenario; 
- Mortality Scenario (MOR) 
Assumes further and significant progress against mortality; all age specific mortality 
rates have been reduced by 30% for women and by 45% for men, all other rates are 
the same as benchmark scenario. 
All changes are assumed to take place within the period 1985 to 2005. For the specific case 
of Germany, additional assumptions were made. Because of the comparative nature of the 
whole project, it seemed useful to calculate the set of four common scenarios for the two 
German states separately, and then to sum them up as one for Germany. This can be easily 
accepted in all cases except for the benchmark scenario. The latter is somehow artificial, 
presenting the plain mixture of significant different demographic features of two different 
states. 
National Scenarios 
Two National Scenarios try to anticipate the most likely demographic trends for the future. 
In general, a strong tendency towards common demographic patterns for all Germany has 
been assumed, with a transition period for East Germany until 2005.4 The most striking 
element of change seems to be the expected changes of age patterns of fertility and nuptiality 
for the East German population, rather than changes in their level. This implies deviation 
from the habits spread uniformly among the East German population, and adaptation to new 
or changed life cyc1es.j Both National 1 (NAT 1) and National 2 (NAT 2) scenarios are 
identical with respect to the basic demographic assumptions, but the latter additionally 
considers a large and long-lasting external inmigration to Germany (for the demographic 
The duration of the transition period has been chosen according to the transition periods for some of 
the standard scenarios. 
The transition period necessary to develop common demographic patterns in Germany was the main 
reason to technically process the forecasts for East Germany and West Germany separately. 
parameters see Table 7). Additionally, the 1990 population for the two countries was 
estimated using observed rates in order to get a realistic initial population for the unified 
Germany. 
- National 1 Scenario (NAT 1) 
A shift of fertility age patterns towards older mean age of childbearing, nuptiality age 
patterns towards later first marriage, and later divorce have been assumed. The levels 
of the main demographic processes of the former GDR were closely adapted to FRG 
levels observed in the late 1980s. 
- National 2 Scenario (NAT 2) 
Keeping all other settings as in National 1, an annual inmigration of 200,000 people 
has been assumed, resulting in an inflow of 12 million people in total between 1990 
and 2050. This seems to be extreme at first glance, but plausible when compared to 
the amount of inmigration to (West) Germany during the last four decades. 
Table 7: The parameter for the German national scenarios. 
Scenario/ 
country 
Paremeter 
F e r t i l i t y  
(TFR) 
1985/90: 500000 
outmigrat ion 
t o  FRG 
1990/95: 400000 
r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n  
t o  Vest Germany 
1985/90: 500000 
inmigrat ion 
from GDR 
1990/95: 400000 
r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n  
from East Germny 
1985/2000: 
2.1 m i l l i o n  
i tm ig ra t ion  
o f  Germans from 
Eastern Europe 
1985/90: 520000 
i tm ig ra t ion  
o f  foreigners 
MTIOWAL 1 
East 
-=W 
Yest 
G e m  
MTlWAL 2 
Nupt ia l  i t y  M o r t a l i t y  
( l i f e  exp.) 
Migrat ion 
1985: 1.856 
1990: 1.600 
change t o  FRG 
age pa t te rn  
2005: 1.500 
const. 
1985: 1.28 
2005: 1.43 
const. 
as NAT 1 
1985: 69.1 (m) 
75.1 ( f )  
2005: 73.0 (m) 
79.0 (m) 
const. 
1985: 75.1 (m) 
79.0 ( f )  
as NAT 1 
f i r s t  marriaae: 
1985: as observed 
1990: change t o  FRG age pa t te rn  
level:  80% o f  GDR (1985) 
const. 
remarriage: 
1985: as observed (1985) 
const. 
divorce: 
1985: as observed 
1990: change t o  FRG age pa t te rn  
level:  120% o f  FRG (1985) 
const. 
widowhood 
1985: as observed 
const. 
f i r s t  marriage: 
1985: as observed 
2005: s l i g h t  increase i n  
older, but  decrease 
i n  younger age groups 
remarriage. divorce, widowhood: 
const. on 1985 Level 
as NAT 1 as NAT 1 
1990/2050: 
12.0 m i l l i o n  
inmigrat ion of 
foreigners 
(200,000 annua 1 1 y) 
2.2. Changes in the Size and Age Structure of the Population 
The population of Germany in all scenarios--in the long run--will decrease (see Figure 6 and 
Table 8). This is true even with fertility assumed to be at replacement level (FER) or with 
massive inmigration (NAT 2). The decrease varies between 9 1.8 % and 75.4 % in 2030, and 
82.6% and 57.1 % in 2050, respectively, as compared with the population size of 1990. Both 
the Western and the Benchmark Scenarios imply the largest decrease in the size of 
population: from 78.4 million in 1990 to about 60 million in 2030 (WEST), and to around 
45 million in 2050 (BM). On the other hand, with the Fertility Scenario andlor the 
inmigration assumption (NAT 2), the population decrease is the smallest. Note that in the 
long run, a population inflow of 12 million foreigners in the period between 1990 and 2050 
(NAT 2) could not compensate for missing replacement level of fertility; in 2050 the total 
population of Germany is estimated to be 64.7 million under replacement assumption, but 
only 62.0 million resident population has been estimated under the inmigration assumption. 
The possible range of change is rather wide: 13 million between the Benchmark and National 
2 Scenarios in 2030, and 17.3 million between Western and Fertility Scenarios in 2050. 
Even if one takes only the two National Scenarios into account, the estimated difference in 
population size is rather large, 8.4 million inhabitants in 2030 or 12.2 million in 2050, 
respectively. 
. . . . . . . . . 
---a- 
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0. 
Calendar Years 
Figure 6: Total population of Germany, 1985 - 2050. 
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Table 8: German population by broad age groups and scenarios, total and relative. 
I Total ( i n  1000s) I Relative ( i n  X )  
Bedmark Scenario 
Year 
Yestern Scenario 
F e r t i l i t y  Scenario 
Mortality Scenario 
l W 0  12589 49765 16050 78404 
0-14 
National 1 Scenario 
16.1 63.5 20.5 100.0 
0-14 
Natimal  2 Scenario 
15-59 
Not only the size, but also the age composition of the population is subject to changes under 
the different scenarios. For all but the replacement assumption (FER), a decline in the 
percentage as well as the absolute number of population under age 15 has been estimated (see 
Table 8). For the year 2030, the possible ratio of people below age 15 on total population 
varies between 10.8% (Western Scenario) and 18.5 % (Fertility Scenario). 
15-59 
For the older age groups, a further increase in number as well as in percentage is calculated 
to happen by the year 2030 (see Figure 7). With 16.0 million older people in 1990, it is 
expected that there will be between 25.3 million (Mortality Scenario) and 20.1 million 
(Benchmark and Fertility Scenarios) in 2030. After the year 2030, the absolute number of 
people 60 years and older is estimated to significantly decline for all scenarios. However, 
at the same time, the percentage of old age people does not decrease for all scenarios; the 
Western and Mortality Scenarios show a levelling off or even a further increase. 
60+ 60+ Total Total 
2000 201 5 2030 2050 
Calendar Years 
Figure 7: Percentage of the elderly, Germany 1985 - 2050. 
For the Benchmark and Fertility Scenarios the absolute number of people aged 60 and over 
in 2050 will be below those figures estimated for 1990. As far as the two National Scenarios 
are concerned, the number of old age people is higher for the National 2 Scenario, whereas 
the percentage is higher for the National 1 Scenario. Furthermore, the number of old people 
in 2050 does not differ very much from the number estimated for 1990 (2050: 16.3 million 
for National 1, 18.9 million for National 2; 1990: 16.0 million). 
Changes in age composition can also be seen in terms of dependency ratios (see Table 9). 
The Total Dependency Ratio (TDR), expressing the proportion of non-active to active 
pop~lation,~ increases for all scenarios until the year 2020 (see Figure 8). The 'burden' per 
active person, however, is expected to differ widely between the different scenario 
assumptions. Starting with 45 non-active per 100 active in 1990, the TDR can be expected 
to be between 60 and 74 in 2030. In some scenarios, the TDR is expected to increase even 
further (Western Scenario, Mortality Scenario), while for the others a slight decrease can be 
seen. The general tendency towards an increase in TDR is mostly due to significant increases 
in the Old Age Dependency Ratio (OADR), taking into account the ratio of persons aged 65 
and older per 100 persons in age group 15 to 65 (see Figure 9). 
Active population has been identified as those persons of legal working age (15 - 64), and non-active 
population as those below 15 and over 65. 
Table 9: Dependency ratios for Germany. 
I I I 
1985 2000 201 5 2030 2050 
Calendar Years 
Scenario 
Figure 8: Total Dependency Ratio, Germany 1985 - 2050. 
1990 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Youw Age ( u d c r  15 )  
Benchmark 22.8 19.3 20.7 20.4 
Uestern 22.3 17.4 18.1 16.9 
F e r t i l i t y  25.4 26.8 30.9 31.2 
Morta l i ty  22.7 19.0 20.4 20.1 
Nationel 1 23.3 23.5 19.6 21.5 20.4 
Nationel 2 23.3 23.9 20.2 22.1 21.2 
O l d  Age (65 mi over) 
Benchmark 24.1 29.2 41.1 39.9 
Uestern 25.1 33.3 49.0 53.3 
F e r t i l i t y  24.1 28.4 36.0 27.9 
Morta l i ty  25.5 35.9 53.2 56.3 
National 1 21.7 23.9 29.3 41.5 40.6 
National 2 21.7 23.6 28.4 38.4 36.8 
Total 
Benchmark 46.9 48.5 61.8 60.3 
Uestern 47.4 50.6 67.1 70.1 
F e r t i l i t y  49.6 55.2 66.9 59.1 
Morta l i ty  48.2 54.9 73.6 76.4 
N a t i o n a l 1  45.0 47.4 49.0 63.0 61.0 
National 2 45.0 47.6 48.6 60.5 58.1 
2000 201 5 2030 
Calendar Years 
Figure 9: Old Age Dependency Ratio, Germany, 1985 - 2050. 
20 
19 
18 
17 
16 
1985 2000 201 5 2030 2050 
Calendar Years 
Figure 10: Young Age Dependency Ratio, Germany, 1985 - 2050. 
The increase in the number of elderly compensates for the fall in the Young Age Dependency 
Ratio for all but the Fertility Scenario (see Figure 10). As for the two National Scenarios the 
differences are rather minor, which implies that inmigration does not change the ratios active 
to non-active population substantially. The process of aging remains the main trend under all 
assumptions. 
2.3. Changes in the Marital Composition of the Elderly 
In the context of social security, and especially with respect to the pension problem, the 
marital composition of the elderly is of considerable interest, not only because of different 
pension types, such as survivor pension, but also because of different living arrangements 
connected with marital status. In 1990, the marital composition of the elderly differs only 
slightly between East and West Germany. The percentage of married old age females is 
higher for West Germany, whereas the percentage of married males is almost the same (see 
Table 10). Both East and West Germany show that a majority of old age males is still 
married (more than three-quarters), while there is a minority of women married in old age 
groups (35 - 39 %). 
Table 10: Marital composition of the population aged 60 and over, East and West 
Germany, 1990 (estimated) (%). 
I East Germany 
Country Single Harr ied Divorced Uidowed Total  
Females 
1 East Germany 1 1 .6  78.0 3 .0  17.4 100.0 1 
Uest Germany 
The future trends for the number as well as the marital composition of the elderly are rather 
certain due to the fact that nuptiality dynamics are concentrated in young adulthood and 
mortality changes affect population numbers smoothly. In the long run, the marital 
composition of both males and females is subject to change towards less people being 
married (see Table 11). Consequently, the proportion of old age people living outside their 
own nucleus family is likely to grow remarkably, but to a different amount with respect to 
gender. 
8 .6  38.5 4 .7  48.3 100.0 
Ha 1 es 
As for males aged 60 and over, it is expected that a majority of them will be married, with 
the exception of the Western Scenario after the year 2030. Although almost 80% of the males 
are currently married, this percentage will drop between 60% and 50% until 2030 for the 
different scenarios (see Figure 1 1). 
Table 11: Marital composition of the elderly in Germany (people aged 60 and over, in 
percentages). 
For the growing group of unmarried elderly males, the never married are expected to become 
the majority. The percentage of never married males will increase from 3.7% in 1990 to 
about 20% in 2030 (varying between 18.4% and 22.5%). In the year 2050, this percentage 
will be about 25 %, with the exception of the Western Scenario, resulting in 35 % never 
married males (see Figure 12). 
Although the general trend against formal marital unions is also found for old age females, 
some specific features are likely to happen. For the next 10 to 20 years, there is a temporal 
trend towards increasing married women among the age group under consideration. This is 
because the age, sex, and marital status composition of the elderly will successively rectify 
its disturbances and imbalances brought about by World War I1 (see Table 12). The general 
trend, however, will clearly appear for the years after 200012015. Until the end of the 
projection period, the percentage of married women is estimated to vary between 25% 
(Western Scenario) and 37.4 % (Mortality Scenario). 
Year Males 
1990 8 .3  37 .8  5 .2  48.6 100.0 
Femeles 
Single 
sarhrerk Scenario 
2000 6 .9  41.6 6 .5  45.0 100.0 
2015 6 . 6  39.0 9 .3  45.1 100.0 
2030 13.1 35.9 9 .8  41.2 100.0 
2050 16.3 30.6 9 .4  43.8 100.0 
3 .7  78.2 3.1 15.0 100.0 
Married Single 
5 .8  75.0 5.3 14.0 100.0 
11.4 66.4 7 .4  14.9 100.0 
21.3 59.0 7 .2  12.5 100.0 
24.5 55.4 6 .9  13.2 100.0 
Divorced Married Divorced 
Lkstern Scenario 
Midowed 
2000 7.0 41.8 6 . 6  44.6 100.0 
2015 6 . 7  39.1 11.4 42.9 100.0 
2030 13.0 33.7 15.9 37.4 100.0 
2050 22.3 25.1 16.5 36.1 100.0 
Total Uidowed 
5.7  75.0 5 .6  13.6 100.0 
11.2 64.2 10.2 14.3 100.0 
22.5 52.5 12.8 12.1 100.0 
35.1 41.4 11.6 11.9 100.0 
Total 
Fer t i l i t y  Scenario 
2000 6 .9  41.6 6 .5  45.0 100.0 
201 5 6 . 6  39.0 9 .3  45.1 100.0 
2030 13.2 35.8 9 .8  41.2 100.0 
2050 16.5 30.2 9.5 43.8 100.0 
5 .8  75.0 5 .3  14.0 100.0 
11.4 66.4 7 .4  14.9 100.0 
21.3 59.1 7.1 12.5 100.0 
24.2 56.0 6 . 7  13.1 100.0 
Mortality Scenario 
2000 7 .0  43.4 6 .5  43.2 100.0 
201 5 6 . 6  46.1 9.1 38.1 100.0 
2030 12.4 43.8 9 . 8  34.0 100.0 
2050 15.7 37.4 9 .6  37.3 100.0 
5 .7  75.3 5 .2  13.9 100.0 
10.6 66.9 7 .0  15.4 100.0 
19.5 58.6 7 .0  14.9 100.0 
23.7 52.4 6 . 8  17.1 100.0 
National 1 Scenario 
2000 6 .8  41.9 6 .9  44.4 100.0 
2015 6 .2  39.9 9 . 7  44.1 100.0 
2030 10.4 38 .6  10.4 40.6 100.0 
2050 14.9 32 .7  9 . 8  42.6 100.0 
5 .7  74.8 5.5 14.1 100.0 
10.9 66.2 7 . 8  15.0 100.0 
19.4 59 .9  7 .9  12.8 100.0 
25.9 53.4 7 .1  13.6 100.0 
National 2 Scenario 
2000 6 .8  42.1 7.1 44.0 100.0 
2015 6 .2  40.2 10.0 43 .7  100.0 
2030 9 .9  39.2 10.6 40.3 100.0 
2050 13.3 34.3 10.1 42.2 100.0 
5.6 74 .8  5.6 14.0 100.0 
10.6 66 .3  7 .9  15.2 100.0 
18.4 60.5 8 .0  13.1 100.0 
23.6 54.9 7 .4  14.0 100.0 
20 
1985 2000 201 5 2030 2050 
Calendar Years 
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Females 60 and over 
Figure 1 1 : Percentage married among the elderly, Germany, 1985 - 2050. 
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Figure 12: Percentage single among the elderly, Germany, 1985 - 2050. 
Table 12: Sex ratio of the elderly (males aged 60+ per 100 females aged 60+). 
Benchmark 70.7 76.2 78.4 74.3 
Western 70.3 76.0 78.6 74.3 
F e r t i l i t y  70.7 76.2 78.4 74.3 
M o r t a l i t y  72.5 85.7 92.1 92.4 
Nat ional  1 58.9 70.3 76.3 79.8 75.8 
Nat ional  2 58.9 70.4 76.0 79.7 77.0 
3. WORK PATTERNS AND RETIREMENT--PAST AND FUTURE 
3.1. Similarities and Dissimilarities--Comparison of East and West Germany 
In both East and West Germany the work patterns of males and non-married females were 
almost similar to other developed countries. The labor force participation rates were, and still 
are, considerably high, more or less for all but the very young and the older age groups. In 
the last decade only minor changes have been observed with respect to the younger age 
groups as a result of longer duration of education. For divorced and widowed women, a 
slight trend of increasing participation in the older age groups occurred. 
Strong differences with respect to employment have been observed between the GDR and the 
FRG for married women. In the FRG a 3-phase sequence can be observed: a high labor force 
participation for very young females; a drop between the ages of 25 and 35 because of inter- 
rupting economic activities due to the birth of children; and subsequently a rise of labor force 
participation, followed by a steady decrease until pension age. Although in the past the labor 
force participation of married women increased, especially in the older age groups, the 
typical pattern remains more or less unchanged. 
In the GDR, rather different patterns have evolved. Since the 1950s, where the employment 
behavior of married women was similar to the FRG, the participation rates increased to a 
pattern similar to that of non-married women. For the mid-1980s, the age specific 
participation rates were close to 90% for age groups between 25 and 50, and no substantial 
influence of childbearing activities on the nominal labor force participation exists. There are 
two main reasons for this. First, as already stated, reproductive activities were positioned in 
very young age groups, just before or at the beginning of intense economic activities, when 
the combination of parenthood and continued labor force participation seemed to be e a ~ i e r . ~  
Second, the comprehensive child-care network helped most of the mothers combine, to a 
certain extent, motherhood/parenthood and economic activities. 
Further differences between the two German states can be observed for people older than 60. 
In the FRG the labor force participation rates have dropped substantially since the 1970s for 
men as well as for women, which implies a corresponding earlier retirement. In the GDR 
the decrease was much slower for women while for men a little increase of the participation 
rates was seen. Therefore the retirement age was higher in the GDR than in the FRG. 
' For example, it was quite common for female students to combine pregnancy with studying. 
3.2. Labor Activity Scenarios for Germany 
The unification of Germany already has and will continue to have strong impacts on the labor 
force, especially for East Germany. The expected dramatic changes in economic and social 
conditions might result in changes in both the level and age pattern of labor force 
participation rates. One should assume that the patterns assimilate, after a transition period, 
to those of the FRG. But also in West Germany changes in activity rates, especially for 
women, are likely. First, there is some evidence that the trend of increasing female labor 
force participation is continuing, but may be slower than in the past. Second, very low mean 
age at retirement in the 1980s was, to some extent, the outcome of policy measures to reduce 
unemployment. We might assume, therefore, slightly increasing activity rates in the older age 
groups for the future. 
For the pension calculation (see Section 5) three different assumptions have been chosen with 
respect to employment/labor force participation for the time period under consideration. 
- Activity Benchmark Scenario 
For the transition period assumed to last until 2005, region-specific but converging 
assumptions have been made. After 2005, the labor force participation rates will be 
the same for all of Germany and will be kept constant until 2050. The assumptions 
are as follows: 
Never Married Women: The 1985 rates are held constant for East and West 
Germany throughout the whole projection period. 
Married Women: For West Germany a slight increase in participation rates is 
assumed until 2005, except for the youngest age group. For East Germany the 1990 
activity rates have been set only to 90% of the GDR 1985 level. Until the year 2005, 
there will be a further decline to the West German level in 2005. 
Divorced and Widowed Women: For West Germany an increase in activity rates is 
assumed in the older age groups (35 and older) until 2005. For East Germany the 
1985 rates are assumed to be still valid for 1990, but a transition is expected to the 
2005 West German level. 
Males, all marital statuses: For West Germany the activity rates are held constant 
for all but the last age group (60-64), for which the rate increases to 55% in 2005. 
For East Germany a change between 1990 and 2005 to the FRG level is assumed. 
- Low Activity Scenario 
Sets the labor activity of women for both East and West Germany to the level 
observed in the FRG in 1985. For East Germany, an immediate adaptation to this 
level has been assumed. 
- Late Retirement Scenario 
Assumes a rise of the mean age of retirement to 65 years with all other settings as in 
the activity benchmark. 
4. SOCIAL SECURITY IN A UNITED GERMANY 
4.1. Historical Background 
Social security has a long tradition in Germany. As early as 1883 a compulsory health 
insurance for blue collar workers was established by law on the 'Reich' level. An insurance 
covering work accidents and a pension system providing disability and old age benefits fol- 
lowed in 1884 and 1889, respectively. In 1911 the system was extended to white collar, 
salaried workers. Since then, the system has been extended gradually to cover additional 
groups like craftsmen and portions of the self-employed. But in principle it always remained 
an insurance system related to those employed. Basically, it covers the loss of earnings 
caused by unemployment, sickness, disability or old age, and is financed by contributions 
that are defined as a percentage of individual earnings. 
From the beginning, the system was split up into different institutions covering different risks 
for different groups in different regions. This is especially true for the health insurance 
system that was organized primarily at the local level. Different bodies for the pension 
insurance were also created for different groups of workers mostly at the federal state level. 
Major institutional changes took place both after 1934 and 1945, and after 1949 different 
developments took place in the FRG and GDR, respectively. 
In the GDR, a large number of about 1300 different insurance bodies was merged into five 
institutions in 1947, one for each of the federal states that belonged to the zone occupied by 
the Soviet Union. But even then, about 150 institutions for specific professions remained in 
addition to the state bodies. In 1952 the system was centralized further when the federal 
states were disbanded. The most significant change occurred in 1956, when the centralized 
trade unions took over to govern the Social Insurance for Workers and Employees8 (SIWE) 
and it was in principle integrated into the state budget. In order to stress the 'socialist' 
character of the system, contributions from workers and employers were frozen and an 
increasing part of the expenditure was covered from the general budget (cf. Winkler, 1989, 
p. 98). 
The social security system in the FRG was related more closely to the traditional German 
system than the system in the GDR. Most institutions remained almost unchanged and most 
of the basic regulations were kept. However, a major reform of the pension system took 
place in 1957 when a dynamic, wage-related pension was introduced. Pensions were to be 
paid proportionally to individual contributions that were defined as a percentage of earned 
income. The tax rate.for contributions to the pension system was set by federal regulations 
to cover current expenditure. In addition, a subsidy from the general budget was granted to 
cover those expenses that are not part of the insurance, but rather a consequence of general 
redistribution policy. 
Presently a single system for all of Germany has been created by merging the system of the 
GDR into the system of the FRG. The basic principles of the West German system have 
already been implemented in East Germany. But, for a period of transition, some differences 
remain due mainly to economic and administrative reasons. However, after several years the 
pension system of East Germany will be merged into the system of the Federal Republic, 
with the same regulations applying to both regions. This is not only true for present 
regulations but also for future changes in the system that are to occur according to legislation 
In German: "Sozialversicherung der Arbeiter und Angestellten." 
on the pension reform in 1992. Basically, an attempt will be made to strengthen the pension 
system against demographic trends that are expected to result in rising pension expenditures 
in the future. 
4.2. The Pension System of the GDR 
In the GDR old age pensions were provided by a state pension system as part of a 
comprehensive, obligatory public social insurance system which provided both monetary and 
benefits in kind in cases of sickness, accidents, retirement (see Table 13), and motherhood. 
It consisted of two different parts, differing with respect to the clientele: 
(1) The Social Insurance of Workers and Employees (SIWE), covering about 85 % of all 
GDR working people (e.g. workers and employees, but also physicians, dentists, or 
veterinarians). 
(2) The Social Insurance of the State Insurance Company9 (SISIC) in which members of 
cooperatives, private craftsmen, private trade persons, and free-lancers were insured. 
In the following we will concentrate on SIWE (see Table 14) which served the majority of 
the people. Under this scheme the insured person had to contribute 10% of his or her taxable 
income up to a limit of 600 GDR Mark. In addition, the employer had to contribute another 
12.5% of taxable income. Income over 600 Mark was not insured in the compulsory social 
insurance scheme. It should be stressed that these were the total contributions for coverage 
of all types of benefits (illness, accident, motherhood, retirement). 
In order to cover income over 600 Mark, a Voluntary Additional Pension Scheme (VAPS) 
was introduced in 1971. In general, the contribution to VAPS amounted to 20% of the 
income over 600 Mark, split equally by the employee and the employer. This scheme 
provided additional benefits for old age, disability, and survivor pensions. However, the 
VAPS did not gain importance before the mid-1980s. In 1985, the total expenditure for 
VAPS benefits amounted to about 4% of all spending for pensions. 
In the GDR, pensions were not indexed according to increases in income. However, pensions 
were increased by discretionary political decisions. The ratio between pensions and average 
income was at about 30%, but the absolute gap between income and pensions widened (see 
Table 15). 
It was because of the specific centralized nature of SIWE and the inherent ideology of the 
former bureaucratic GDR society that the state subsidy to the insurance budget rose from the 
very beginning, and was close to 50% of the total budget of SIWE by the late 1980s (see 
Table 16). From a technical point of view, this was a redistribution of monetary funds 
stemming from the tremendous taxation on enterprise. It must be noted that not only SIWE 
but also SISIC received a significant state subsidy. 
In German: "Sozialversicherung bei der Staatlichen Versicherung." 
Table 13: Types of pensions in the state pension system. 
Table 14: Basic traits of the GDR pension system, as of 1988. 
Type o f  
pens i on 
o l d  age 
d i s a b i l i t y  
accident 
su rv i vo r  
war-disabled 
vo lun ta ry  
a d d i t i o n a l  
Source: Soc ia l  Report 1990 ,  p. 225 
Precondi t ions 
Type o f  
scheme 
Soc ia l  
Insurance 
f o r  Uorkers 
and Employees 
Soc ia l  
Insurance 
o f  t he  S ta te  
Insurance 
m i n i m  age 
Cont r ibut ions 
(as percentage o f  
income l i a b l e  t o  
subsc r ip t i on )  
o b l i g a t o r y  insured pensions 
males 65  
females 6 0  a t  l eas t  15 years 
none a t  l eas t  5 years 
none none phys ica l  i n j u r y  
o f  a t  l eas t  20% 
none a t  l eas t  5 years 
none phys ica l  i n j u r y  
o f  a t  l eas t  2 / 3  
vo lun ta ry  add i t i ona l  pensions 
males 65  income h igher  than 
females 6 0  6 0 0 . -  GDR Hark 
du ra t i on  o f  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  
o the r  
insurant  : o b l i g a t o r y  1 8 3 0 . 0  3 8 0 . 9 4  
10% o b l i g a t o r y  ob l i g .  B vo lun ta ry  6 9 0 . 0  4 8 1 . 5 6  
10% vo lun ta ry  
su rv i vo r  (unabridged) 7 0 . 0  3 4 7 . 0 8  
employer: surv. B vo lun ta ry  16 .5  406 .95  
12.5% o b l i g a t o r y  
10% vo lun ta ry  o l d  age d i s a b i l i t y  8 0 . 0  355 .20  
disab. B vo lun ta ry  14 .0  4 5 8 . 4 9  
insurant  : o b l i g a t o r y  3 3 0 . 0  363 .00  
20% o b l i g a t o r y  ob l i g .  B vo lun ta ry  100 .0  446 .52  
20% vo lun ta ry  
su rv i vo r  (unabridged) 1 0 . 0  3 0 1 . 0 7  
surv. B vo lun ta ry  0 . 5  3 5 7 . 7 0  
o l d  age d i s a b i l i t y  8 0 . 0  3 5 5 . 2 0  
disab. B vo lun ta ry  1 4 . 0  4 5 8 . 4 9  
Type o f  pension claimants 
( i n  1 0 0 0 )  
average 
pension 
( i n  GDR Hark 
per month) 
Table 15: Comparison of average income and average pension. 
Source: S t a t i s t i c a l  Yearbook o f  the  GDR, various issues 
Table 16: Income and expenditures of the Social Insurance of Workers and Employees 
(SWE) (in million GDR Mark). 
Years average 
income 
average 
pension 
Source: S t a t i s t i c a l  Yearbook of the  GDR, various issues, author's c a l c u l a t i o n s  
1950 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1985 
1989 
d i f f e r e n c e  
Years 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1989 
4.3. The System in the FRG: Past and Future 
( i n  GDR Hark) 
31 1 90.7 220.3 
555 152.7 402.3 
755 199.2 555.8 
1 021 342.5 678.5 
1 130 377.0 753.0 
1 300 446.6 853.4 
Basically, the pension system of the FRG, which will be maintained in the unified Germany, 
is related to employed work with two different principal schemes. The majority of the 
employed are insured in the compulsory old age insurance system. Formally, this system was 
split up into different institutions at the state level for workers, a federal insurance for 
salaried workers, and special institutions for some industries and professions. However, for 
all these institutions, basically the same regulations apply and funds are transferred between 
the institutions in order to balance the system as a whole. Thus, in most aspects, the old age 
insurance system can be regarded as a single system. It is designed as a pay-as-you-go 
system with current contributions used to pay for current pension expenditures. Only a 
comparatively small fund is maintained to compensate for short term fluctuations in 
expenditure and revenue. However, from the perspective of the insured, the system appears 
as an insurance with claims depending on the contributions paid during the individual's life 
cycle. 
A different approach is used for civil servants acting as state functionaries ('Beamte'). 
Traditionally, this group does not pay contributions to an insurance system on an individual 
basis, but is entitled to receive pensions that are provided from the general budget. Basically, 
these pensions depend on the last income and on the duration of the service. Presently, only 
functionaries of the former FRG are covered by this system while civil servants of the former 
GDR are insured in the general old age insurance. However, in the future, the system will 
also be applied to East Germany. Formally, the system is not designed as an insurance 
l ncome 
5846 5726 5993 2.45 
6737 6635 8034 16.14 
7015 6949 9547 26.52 
7950 7902 12187 34 .  77 
10147 9178 17617 42.40 
13299 11254 24785 46.34 
15164 12092 27733 45.32 
16795 12347 32437 48.22 
Expenditure 
t o t a l  t o t a l  S t a t e  subsidy 
(percentage 
o f  t o t a l  
expenditures) 
from obl iga-  
t o r y  c o n t r i -  
but i ons 
system, but it can be interpreted as an insurance scheme where the government pays 
contributions for the civil servants directly into a (fictitious) fund that is used to provide 
pensions.1° Since it covers only a comparatively small part of the population, and there is 
a tendency to make the system more compatible with the compulsory insurance system, only 
the compulsory insurance system will be considered in this analysis. 
Historically, self-employed persons and helping family members have not been covered by 
the pension system. However, in the course of time, some groups of the self-employed have 
been forced into the insurance system in order to guarantee appropriate old age income. For 
others, the system has been opened on a voluntary basis. As a consequence, a substantial 
number of self-employed persons and of helping family members is today insured in the old 
age insurance system. 
Some basic figures on the coverage of the public pension system are presented in Table 17. 
The table is based on survey data of 1981 since in the official insurance system data, 
individuals count twice if they have pension claims at different institutions. In the age bracket 
of 40 to 60 years, only 1% of all men have no claims in a public pension scheme. Almost 
all of the male population is covered by the system because practically all men are employed 
at some time. The same is not true for women. About 30% of the women over age 40 had 
no pension claims of their own in 1981. However, most of these women are married and are 
entitled to receive dependents' benefits if they survive their husbands. 
Table 17: Coverage of the public pension system in the FRG, 1981. 
Source: P. Hirvonen, 1990 
Individuals 40-60 years old 
1 w e d  
Employed 
Pension insurance 
State functionary 
Sel f  enployed 
Mot insured 
individuals 65-80 old  
Uith p lb l ic  pension 
Pension insurance 
Own claims 
Only Dep. benefits 
State functionary 
Own claims 
Only Dep. benefits 
Other public pensions 
Yo plbl ic pension 
A similar picture is obtained for the population in the age bracket 65 to 80 years. About 90% 
of the men and 80% of the women receive a public pension. Roughly one out of ten 
Wales F ema 1 es 
100% 100% 
99 71 
87  66 
TI 64 
10 2 
12 5 
1 29 
100% 100% 
81 71 
8 1 5 0 
0 21 
10 7 
10 1 
0 5 
1 1 
8 24 
'O This is the way the system is dealt with in the national accounts. 
pensioners is covered by the system of the state functionaries while the rest belong to the old 
age insurance system. While practically all men receive a pension of their own, 26% of the 
women receive only dependents' benefits that are derived from the pension claim of the 
deceased husband. A substantial portion of women do not receive a pension at all. Since most 
pensions can be claimed by those over 65 even when working, this implies that about 8% of 
the men and 24% of the women are not covered by a public pension system. However, a 
large portion of these women are entitled to receive dependents' benefits when widowed. In 
the future, the number of elderly persons without a pension claim of their own will be 
reduced substantially since the coverage of the public pension schemes has been extended in 
the younger cohorts, and the requirements for a pension entitlement have been lowered." 
Currently, the pension system covers almost the entire active population. In 1985, about 32 
million people were insured in the pension system (see Table 18). Compulsory contributions 
are defined as a fixed proportion of gross earnings up to an upper limit of (approximately) 
twice the average income of the insured. Income above this limit remains untaxed. In 
general, half of the contributions is paid by the employer and half by the employee. The tax 
rate was 18.7% in 1985 and has changed slightly since then. It is set by the federal 
parliament in a discretionary way in order to cover current expenditures of the system. 
Table 18: Basic traits of the (West) German pension system. 
Persons insured ( i n  1000) 
Tota l  
Compulsory 
Voluntary 
Latent 
Character is t ics  
Average taxable  income (DM) 47096 
Tax r a t e  (%) 
Number of Pensions (1000) 
Total  
Old age bene f i t s  
Handicapped 
Dependents 
Pension System Type 
Average Benef i t  (DM/year) 
Standard pension* 
Average old-age bene f i t  
A1 l pensioners 
Men 
Insurance 
system 
(1986) 
( i n  m i l l i o n  DM) 
Contributions 148688 
Pensions 169838 37867 
Subsidy 34405 37867 
S ta te  func- 
t ionar ies  
(1986) 
I I I 
Based on 40 years insured u i t h  average income (DM/year) 
Sources: Statuary system--Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungstrlger, Ed., 1989; 
S ta te  Functionaries--Governmental Reply t o  the I n t e r p e l l a t i o n  of the Social  Democrats, 1988 
I '  Starting from 1992, an insured period of at least 5 years is required for a pension entitlement. Women 
are granted three years insured for each child born. Cf. Bundesminister f i r  Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 
1990. 
Formally, the standard retirement age in Germany is set at 65 years for both men and 
women. However, early retirement plans have allowed people to retire earlier. Presently, 
early retirement is available to men at age 63 and for women at age 60, if some additional 
requirements are met. Early retirement before age 60 is also available to persons who have 
been unemployed for a long time. This, and the provision of early retirement for the handi- 
capped, has resulted in a lowering of the average age of retirement during the last years. 
However, the age of retirement will gradually be raised again to 65 years in the years 2001 
to 2005, as a consequence of the 1992 pension reform. From then, early retirement will be 
possible only with pensions reduced actuarially (i.e. by 0.3% for each month before age 65). 
This is meant as a measure to cope with rising pension expenditures in the next decades. 
Pension entitlement on the other hand depends on the individual contributions and on general 
economic growth. In principle they are computed as a product of a standard pension and a 
factor that represents individual contributions. This factor is computed as the sum of the 
ratios of the taxed income of the individual to the average income for all years insured. As 
a consequence, individual entitlement is proportional to the relative (taxed) income of the in- 
dividual, as compared to the average contributor, and is proportional to the time during 
which contributions have been paid. Since in the past, the base standard pension has been 
defined as a given percentage of the average income of the insured, pensions are directly 
linked to the general economic development: increases in average income lead to proportional 
changes in pension payments. 
Up to now, pensions have been linked to average gross income. Since pensions remain 
almost untaxed but tax rates are constantly rising, this implies that pensions have grown 
faster than net income. Presently, the standard pension claim that is obtained after 40 years 
of contributions, corresponding to the average income of the insured, amounts to about 60% 
of the general computation base that equals the average gross income in the last three years. 
Since tax rates will have to be raised in the future due to demographic changes, starting in 
1992 the pensions will be linked to net income. This is achieved by dynamically adjusting 
the standard pension in accordance with changes in average net income of the active 
population. Individual pension claims are then computed as a proportion of the standard 
pension. As a consequence, the ratio of pensions to net wage income will be held constant 
in the future. This implies that the recipients of old age pensions will share a part of the 
additional burden. 
Up to 1986, dependents' benefits were defined as 60% of the pension claim of the deceased, 
and were granted to widows independent of other income. Due to a ruling by the 
constitutional court, widowers are now eligible for dependents' benefits. Other pensions are 
deducted from the dependents' benefits using a linear scheme: 40% of other income over a 
limit of 40% of the general computation base is deducted from the dependents' benefits. The 
most important effects are lower dependents' benefits for persons with large pension claims 
of their own, and substantial reductions in benefits for widowers. In the future, this deduction 
may become more important when women receive higher pensions because of higher female 
earnings and longer working histories. 
4.4. A Simplified Model of the Future German System 
The institutional setting of the pension system in the united Germany will be more or less the 
same as in the former FRG. The centralized East German insurance system will be 
transformed into a decentralized system with several institutions at the federal state level. 
After a transition period, the same regulations as in the former FRG will be applied, 
including the changes planned for the future. Thus, essentially, the system of the former 
Federal Republic has been maintained. 
In principle, the German pension system can be modelled easily if some simplifying 
assumptions are made. If, besides some other non-linearities, the upper limit on taxable 
income (and as a consequence on pensions) is ignored, the system will be linear in average 
income: contributions are paid approximately as a fixed proportion of income, and pensions 
are also defined approximately as proportional to average income. As a consequence, general 
economic growth can be neglected if all terms are expressed as multiples of average 
income.12 Since the pensions of the state functionaries are also computed proportional to 
current average income, in a simplified model, both systems can be merged into one general 
old age pension scheme. Additionally, it is assumed that persons presently not covered by 
the compulsory insurance system are insured in a similar way. Thus, in the model, all 
individuals are assumed to be insured according to the regulations of the public pension 
system. 
Disregarding the differences remaining in a transition period, in the model the regulations 
of the present West German pension system have been applied to both Germanies from the 
very beginning. This implies some errors for the years to come, but after about five years 
this should give an adequate description of the entire system. All calculations are conducted 
as of 1990. Since for the transition period until 2005 different behavioral assumptions are 
applied for both East and West Germany, the model is run for both regions separately and 
then the results are aggregated into one.13 
As for the Pension Benchmark Scenario, the computations have been based on the 
institutional setting of the pension system as of 1985. Parameters like average income, the 
standard pension, and the tax rate have been fixed at the values that have been observed in 
the FRG in that year.14 Institutional changes, like the deductions from dependents' benefits 
introduced in 1986, or the measures of the pension reform bill planned for the future, have 
been considered in separate scenarios as well as in a combined scenario. 
No provision was made for unemployment since in the German pension system, contributions 
to old age insurance are paid for the unemployed by the unemployment insurance. 
l 2  In reality, the growth rate of income affects the system to some extent, since contributions depend on 
current income, while the computation of pensions is based on the average income of previous periods. 
Thus, in the short run, the level of pensions and the financial situation of the system depend on changes 
in the growth rate of income. For the scenarios, a constant growth rate has implicitly been assumed 
with the standard pension being defined as a constant percentage of average income. 
l 3  The only exception is the formula for deducting other income from dependents' benefits, which is 
applied to the combined results. The reason is that due to structural differences the average pensions 
differ for the two regions. Applying the deduction separately then would imply different deduction 
formulas. Thus deductions are computed on the basis of the overall averages for the united Germany. 
l4 Since the system is approximately linear and homogeneous to the first degree, all variables can be 
standardized so that the average income remains constant. However, the assumption contains a small 
inconsistency, since at the same time the standard pension and average income are held constant for 
both men and women, but the structure of the labor force changes over time. Given different average 
incomes for the two sexes, a change in the composition of the labor force by gender implies a change 
in the average income of the employed that would induce a change in the standard pension. This effect 
is neglected in the model. 
5. THE FUTURE OF THE PENSION SYSTEM IN GERMANY 
5.1. The Impact of Demographic Aging 
It is a difficult task to specify a reference scenario for the future pension system in Germany 
as a whole since a common status-quo cannot easily be found. Also, it makes no sense to as- 
sume that no behavioral change will occur in the two former states during the process of 
unification. At least for East Germany adaptation to the changes in the institutional setting 
should be taken into account. Thus, for the Pension Benchmark Scenario some assumptions 
on future trends are implemented. This is especially true for labor force participation, 
transitions into retirement, and average income since the pension system strongly depends 
on these variables. In order to assess the impact of demographic aging (and other behavioral 
factors, such as labor activity), a pension benchmark scenario has to be defined. Different 
settings and assumptions will be made later to discuss possible measures and policies to 
tackle the pension problem. 
- Pension Benchmark Scenario 
Used as a basis for comparison, this scenario is a combination of the National 1 
demographic assumptions, the Activity Benchmark settings, and the institutional 
settings of the West German pension system of 1985. A fast transition process is 
assumed for income, and the average values that have been observed in the FRG in 
1985 are used for both West and East Germany from the very beginning. 
The basic trends in the number of contributors and retirees are substantially linked to 
demographic aging as described above. For Germany as a whole as well as for both West 
and East Germany, the number of people in retirement age, and consequently retirees, 
increases substantially until the year 2030. This number later declines since smaller cohorts 
enter the retirement age. The number of people in working age, or contributors, on the other 
hand, remains more or less constant until the year 2000, and then declines constantly. As a 
consequence, the ratio of contributors to retirees is likely to decrease, putting a higher burden 
on the first. 
While the basic trends are the same for both East and West Germany, some differences 
remain. In general, the effects of demographic aging are less pronounced for East Germany 
with a smaller rise in the number of retirees especially between 2015 and 2030 as compared 
to the FRG. The number of contributors starts to decline earlier in East Germany due to the 
reduction in female labor force participation assumed as a consequence of unification. The 
decline is later slower than for the FRG. Thus, in terms of the old age burden, West 
Germany is gaining from the unification process while East Germany is losing: Without 
unification the problems would be larger in the FRG with even a less favorable ratio of 
contributors to retirees in the year 2030. East Germany on the other hand would be better 
off than the united Germany. However, it should be stressed that these calculations are purely 
demographic and do not account for economic gains and losses. 
Given the economic and institutional setting of the FRG in 1985, total expenditure will 
increase in the Pension Benchmark Scenario by about 30% from 1990 to 2030 (see 
Table 19). At the same time, the revenue of the system will be reduced by about 25% due 
to a smaller number of contributors if the tax rate remains unchanged. With average income 
and pension claims held constant, the contributions cover only 50% of the expenditure in 
2030, as compared to 90% in 1990. If only the contribution rate would be used to balance 
the system with the pensions remaining unchanged, a tax hike from about 20% in 1990 to 
a contribution rate of about 37% would be required in 2030." If, as an alternative, only the 
pensions would be adjusted to cover the deficit, cuts of 50% would be necessary, reducing 
the pensions to one-half.16 
Basically these results remain unchanged if further assumptions are considered with regard 
to female labor force participation (Low Activity Scenario), or inmigration (Inmigration 
Scenario) which have been defined as follows: 
- Inmigration Scenario 
It assumes a permanent inmigration of 200,000 foreigners per year according to the 
National 2 (demographic) Scenario. At least from today's perspective this scenario 
may be regarded as an upper limit of future inmigration, although a comparable 
number of immigrants has been observed in the FRG in the last years. There are 
strong political sentiments that a permanent inmigration of such a size is unbearable 
in the long run and measures are being presently discussed to reduce inmigration.17 
- Low Activity Scenario 
The labor force participation level for women in both East and West Germany is set 
constant at the level observed in the FRG in 1985. 
The additional inmigration results in a substantially larger labor force and larger contributions 
to the pension system. Total revenue still decreases in the long run, but at a lower rate than 
in the Benchmark Scenario. There are also additional expenditures since the number of 
retirees increases when the additional contributors retire. However, the overall financial 
situation of the system improves. An additional 3% to 4% expenditure is covered by 
contributions as compared to the Benchmark Scenario. The main reason is that by a constant 
inflow of immigrants, the active population becomes larger as compared to the elderly. Given 
that the additional labor force is gainfully employed, inmigration implies additional income 
and tax revenue that can be used to cover pension expenditures. 
In principle, changes in labor force participation have a similar effect. This can be seen by 
considering the results of the Low Activity Scenario. For this scenario the overall financial 
situation of the system is not changed significantly in the long run since both revenue and 
expenditure of the pension system decrease. For a transitional period, the deficit becomes 
slightly larger, because in the short run a lower labor force participation implies lower 
contributions to the system, but expenditures do notachange since the number of retirees 
remains the same. But in the long run, pension expenditures also decline since individual 
pension entitlements are smaller if women work less. 
This relationship also holds in the opposite direction. Given the institutional setting of 1985, 
an increase in female labor force participation improves the situation of the pension system 
only transitorily since revenue is raised immediately, but in the long run additional 
l5 Similar results have been obtained by other authors (cf. On the Long-Term Development of the 
Obligatory Pension Insurance, 1987). 
The pension level required to balance the system given the present contribution rate equals the ratio 
of contributions to benefits at constant values. 
'' Total net inmigration to the FRG amounted to 481,945 people in 1988, including about 289,461 
foreigners in addition to German nationals. This substantially exceeds the number of immigrants to 
traditional immigration countries like Canada or Australia. 
contributions result in additional pension claims by women and, therefore, higher 
expenditures. l8 
Table 19: The financial situation of the pension system, 1990 - 2050, three scenarios. 
In all three scenarios considered so far, the financial situation of the pension system 
deteriorates substantially as a consequence of demographic aging. Even if constant 
inmigration at a comparatively high rate is considered, the contribution rate required to 
balance the pension system rises to about 37% in 2030.19 This would imply a total average 
tax rate of about 80% if, in addition, 15% of the contributions to the health and unemploy- 
ment insurance and an average income tax rate of about 30% are assumed. A tax burden of 
that size poses severe economic and political problems. It implies strong incentives for tax 
evasion and activities in the shadow economy. This would add to the problems of the social 
security system. Substantial political unrest might be expected as a consequence of 
distributional conflicts. 
Pension Year 
Scmer i o  
l8  This result changes if other income is deducted from dependents' benefits as has been the rule in the 
FRG since 1986. The cumulation of old age pensions and dependents' benefits is then reduced and total 
expenditure increases less. A rise in female labor force participation has a lasting, but modest positive 
effect on the financial situation of the pension system (see next section, Table 21). 
Benchmark 
l m i g r a t i o n  
Low a c t i v i t y  
Benchmark 
Itmigration 
Lou a c t i v i t y  
Benchmark 
Itmigration 
Low a c t i v i t y  
Benchmark 
l m i g r a t i o n  
Low a c t i v i t y  
l9 The figures for the required tax rate exaggerate the problem to some extent since in 1990 the system 
is not financially balanced, but a subsidy of 9% of the total expenditure is required from the general 
budget. As an alternative measure, a tax rate can be computed that is required to maintain a constant 
relative deficit of the system. Even in this case the tax rate rises to 33.5% in the benchmark scenario 
and 31 96 in the immigration scenario. 
Total m t r i b u t i a n s  
Mio.DM Index (1990=10O) 
21 9704 100 92 74 59 
219704 102 99 85 75 
214365 98 90 73 58 
Total benefits 
nio.DM Index (1990=100) 
242847 109 121 132 102 
242847 110 125 141 118 
245242 107 116 125 96 
Cmtributians/benef i t s  
( i n  X )  
90 83 69 50 52 
90 84 71 54 57 
87 80 68 5 1 53 
Balancing c m t r i b u t i m  r a t e  
( i n  X )  
- 
20.7 22.5 27.2 37.0 35.9 
20.7 22.3 26.2 34.3 32.7 
21.4 23.2 27.5 36.8 35.5 
5.2. Compensating Policy Measures 
In this section, the effects of changes in the pension system that have been implemented in 
the FRG by the pension reform bill as a means to cope with the problems posed by 
demographic aging are disc~ssed.~' The most important approaches to the problem are 
deductions of other income from dependents' benefits, a rise of the mean age of retirement 
to 65 years, and a schedule to distribute the additional burden more equally. The first two 
approaches aim at reducing pension expenditures and obtaining additional revenue in the case 
of later retirement. The third proposal on the other hand aims at a 'just' distribution of the 
additional burden. In Table 20 the effects of these policies are given. 
Income Deduction Scenario 
Other income of survivors is deducted here from their dependents' benefits. Such a measure 
was implemented in the FRG in 1986 in order to comply with rulings on equal rights of men 
and women by the constitutional court. Under this scheme, 40% of the pension income 
exceeding a limit of 40% of the general computation base is deducted from the individual 
dependents' benefit.21 Besides its distributional effect, this measure also has a positive 
impact on the financial situation of the pension system since the cumulation of old age 
pensions and dependents' benefits is reduced. 
The deduction schedule results in lower pension expenditures in Table 20. But the reduction 
is small compared to the large rise in expenditure due to changes in the age structure. The 
contribution rate required to balance the system drops by about half a percent point in 2030. 
Obviously, the present deduction scheme is not sufficient to achieve a strong effect. The main 
reason is that a large portion of the old age pensions of widows is smaller than the income 
limit. This would change to some extent if the wage gap between men and women would be 
reduced. In the model the average income is held constant for men and women respectively, 
with women earning about 55% of the average income of men. The lower income is then 
reflected by lower pension claims of women. As a consequence, given the assumptions of 
the scenario, only a comparatively small percentage of women have income deducted from 
the dependents. The effect of the deduction scheme will be larger if the distribution of 
earnings by gender becomes more equal. 
" Different policies are d i s c d  in On the Long-Tern Development of the Obligatory Pension Insurance 
(1987) and Eckerle et al. (1987). 
*' To estimate the effects of such a scheme, additional assumptions concerning the distribution of pension 
benefits are required since only average inwme and pensions are considered in the basic version of the 
model. For this purpose, the distribution of old age benefits that was observed in the FRG in 1981 has 
been adapted to the average pension benefits that are computed in the model. The amount of deductions 
is then estimated on this basis. First the empirical distribution is approximated by a Weibulldistribu- 
tion. Next, this distribution is adapted to the average pension computed in the model by changing the 
scale parameter in such a way that the mean of the distribution is equal to the value given. In a third 
step the average deductions are estimated as 40% of the conditional expected value of pensions above 
the limit that equals 40% of the current average inwme. Since this expected value could not be 
computed analytically, an approximation to the distribution has been used. 
Table 20: The effects of compensating policy measures. 
Tota l  cmtributiora, r
Pension Benchmark Index 
Income Deduction Index 
Late Retirement Index 
Burden Sharing, wi th  Subsidy Index 
Burden Sharing, no D e f i c i t  Index 
Pmsion Benchmark l ndex 
Income Deduction l ndex 
Late Retirement Index 
Burden Sharing, w i th  Subsidy lndex 
Burden Sharing, no D e f i c i t  lndex 
Pension Benchmark X 
Income Deduction X 
Late Retirement X 
Burdm Sharing, w i th  Subsidy X 
Burden Sharing, no D e f i c i t  X 
Rela t i vc  D e f i c i t  
(as percentage o f  t o t a l  expenditures) 
Pension Benchmark X 
l ncorne Deduction X 
Late Retirement X 
Burden Sharing, w i th  Subsidy X 
Burden Sharing, no D e f i c i t  X 
I B a l r r i n g  C a n t r i t v t i o n  Rate I I 
Pension Benchmark constant X 
Income Deduction pension X 
Late Retirement Level X 
Burden Sharing, wi th  Subsidy X 
Burden Sharing, no D e f i c i t  X 
E a l w i n g  Pension Level I I 
Pension Benchmark constant X 
lncome Deduction con t r ibu t ion  X 
Late Retirement Level X 
Burden Sharing, w i th  Subsidy X 
Burden Sharing, no D e f i c i t  X 
Late Retirement Scenario 
Another policy measure that has been adopted in the 1992 pension reform bill to cope with 
an increasing old age burden is to raise the retirement age. In the past, the average retirement 
age has declined in the FRG to below 59 years. This was mainly a consequence of early 
retirement schemes that were introduced as a response to rising unemployment. Since a 
declining labor force is expected in the future, provisions have been adopted in the pension 
reform bill to shift the standard retirement age back to 65 years.22 To estimate the effects 
a Starting in the year 2001, the retirement age will be raised gradually to 65 years by the year 2005. 
Early retirement still will be possible, but only with reduced pensions. Thus, early retirement will not 
affect pension expenditures. Cf. Bundesmi~ster fir Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 1990. 
of such a policy, a retirement pattern has been applied in the model using a scenario that has 
been observed for men in the FRG in 1970. Before 1970, most individuals retired close to 
age 65. Since in the long run reductions of the labor force should also reduce unemployment, 
the assumption that retirement patterns will change back to those observed before 1970 has 
some plausibility. The same retirement pattern has also been applied to the GDR from the 
very beginning.23 
Since an immediate shift in the retirement age is assumed in the model for 1985, the financial 
situation of the pension system improves dramatically in the short run. For 1990 a surplus 
of about 14% is estimated. This demonstrates the large impact of employment on a 
pay-as-you-go pension system. If unemployment is reduced and people work longer, 
additional contributions are obtained, and at the same time less pensions are paid since 
workers retire later. In the long run, this effect is reduced to some extent since in the 
German system a longer working life results in higher pension claims. But even then the net 
effect remains substantial: the deficit of the system is reduced in the most critical year 2030 
by about 10%. The contribution rate required to balance the system drops to 31% as 
compared to 37% in the benchmark scenario. However, even such a contribution rate implies 
a high overall tax burden. Thus a rise in the retirement age alone is not a sufficient measure 
to balance the system. 
Burden Sharin~ Scenario 
The third measure that has been adopted for the pension reform is a 'burden-sharing' 
approach. It aims at distributing the old age burden on a broad base. The basic idea is to ad- 
just the tax rate, the pension level, and the subsidy from the federal budget to demographic 
changes in such a way that the ratio of the average disposable income of the active population 
and of the pensioners remains unchanged. This is achieved by linking the pension level to 
net income instead of to gross income as in the past. The subsidy from the federal budget is 
also increased at the same rate as the tax rate.24 In this way the increasing old age burden 
is distributed at least approximately on all members of the society and the individual burden 
of the insured is reduced.25 
In the model, labor force participation rates in the age brackets between 50 and 65 years have been 
computed for men and women respectively as proportional to the participation rate in the age bracket 
45-50 years, using the factors observed for men in 1970. In this way the retirement pattern of men 
observed in 1970 is applied in each year. 
The additional subsidy also must be covered by taxes. However, since all income is taxed for the 
general budget and also indirect taxation is used, all groups of the population are levied in this way. 
The distributional effects of this taxation depend on the structure of the general tax schedule. 
Given the starting values to, po and so for 1990, the contribution rate 4, the pension level pi and the 
subsidy si for the burden sharing scheme in year i are computed in the following way using the total 
contributions Ci and total benefits Bi for year i corresponding to the contribution rate to and pension 
level po: 
with f=R,/(tJi + (I-tJ(R, + sJJ) 
and g= (1-tof)/(l -to) 
Since an increase of the subsidy from the general budget also implies an additional tax 
burden if it is not compensated by cuts in public expenditure, two variants of the burden- 
sharing policy have been considered. 
- Burden Sharing, with Subsidy 
In a burden sharing scenario which implies a state subsidy, the regulations of the 
pension reform bill have been modelled with the percentage of the pension 
expenditures covered by the subsidy, rising by the same factor as the contribution 
rate. 
- Burden Sharing, no Deficit 
As an alternative, a scenario has been designed in which the contribution rate and the 
pension level are adjusted in such a way that all pension expenditures are covered by 
contributions, and no deficit occurs that must be covered by a subsidy. The latter 
describes the total effect of the burden sharing policy, including the incidence of the 
federal subsidy if one assumes that the additional taxes required to cover the subsidy 
are distributed to the contributors and pensioners of the pension system 
proportionally. Since no compensation by decreasing public expenditure, for instance 
for the school system, is assumed, this scenario gives a worst case solution. 
For the two versions, a rise of the contribution rate and a reduction of the pension level are 
still required. But the changes are substantially smaller than those required in the other policy 
scenarios. In the burden sharing solution with a federal subsidy, the maximum contribution 
rate in 2030 is reduced to 28% as compared to 37% in the pension benchmark if only the 
contribution rate is adapted. The pension level is reduced by 11 % . This is moderate when 
compared to a reduction of almost 50% that would be necessary if only the pension would 
be adapted. However, the subsidy from the federal budget is raised from about 10% of the 
pension expenditure in 1990 to 16 % in 2030. 
Given the growth of total pension expenditure, a rise of the relative deficit by 6% implies 
a substantial growth of the required subsidy in nominal terms. To some extent this additional 
burden is compensated by a reduction in other expenditure, for instance, related to children. 
But even then the tax burden will increase. If, in the worst case, the deficit is distributed 
proportionally to contributors and retirees (burden sharing, no deficit), the contribution rate 
would rise to 31 % and the pension level would be reduced to 85% of its 1985 value. 
While the income deduction schedule has only a small positive effect on the financial 
situation of the pension system, both the rise of the retirement age and the burden sharing 
approach provide means to substantially reduce the impact of demographic aging. Thus, the 
combined effects of all three measures have been computed. Income deduction, late 
retirement, and burden sharing have been applied to three different scenarios, namely the 
Pension Benchmark, Inmigration, and Low Activity  scenario^.^^ 
Again the two versions of the burden-sharing approach are presented in order to provide an 
upper and lower limit. As a point of reference, the values of the contribution rate, the 
pension level, and the deficit are given if just one parameter is used to balance the whole 
system (see Table 21). For instance, in order to balance the system in 2030, a contribution 
rate of 37% is required if no other measure is applied, or the pension level must be reduced 
AS far as the effects of the combined policy are concerned, the three scenarios mentioned differ from 
those introduced earlier, because all three policy options have been taken into account simultaneously. 
For more detailed information about the scenario settings, see Tables 22 and 23. 
to 56% of the 1990 pension. Alternatively, the deficit would amount to 49.5 % of the total 
expenditure. 
Table 21: The effects of combined policy measures (income deduction, late retirement 
and burden sharing) on the pension system. 
Star t ing  values: Contr ibut ion ra te  18.7% 
Federal subsidy 9.5% 
Pol ic ies/  
E f fec ts  
Benchrark, no measures 
balancing con t r ibu t ion  ra te  X 
balancing pension Level l ndex 
r e l a t i v e  d e f i c i t  X 
P u s i o n  Benchmark 
Burden Sharing Policy, subsidy 
con t r ibu t ion  ra te  X 
pension Level l ndex 
r e l a t i v e  d e f i c i t  X 
Burden Shering Pol icy, no D e f i c i t  
con t r ibu t ion  ra te  X 
pension Level l ndex 
I m i g r a t i o n  
Burden Sharing Policy, subsidy 
con t r ibu t ion  ra te  X 
pension Level l ndex 
r e l a t i v e  d e f i c i t  X 
Burden Sharing Policy, no D e f i c i t  
con t r ibu t ion  ra te  X 
pension Level l ndex 
Lou A c t i v i t y  
Burden Sharing Policy, subsidy 
con t r ibu t ion  ra te  X 
pension Level Index 
r e l a t i ve  d e f i c i t  X 
Burden Sharing Policy, no D e f i c i t  
con t r ibu t ion  ra te  X 
pension level  l ndex 
1990 2000 2015 2030 2050 
20.7 22.5 27.2 37.0 35.9 
100 92 76 56 58 
9.5 17.0 31.2 49.5 48.0 
15.7 17.0 19.9 24.2 23.9 
104 102 99 93 94 
7.7 8.5 10.3 13.2 13.0 
16.7 18.3 21.7 26.9 26.5 
102 101 96 90 90 
15.7 16.8 19.4 23.0 22.5 
104 102 99 95 95 
7 .7  8.4 10.0 12.4 12.0 
16.7 18.1 21.1 25.5 24.8 
102 101 97 92 93 
16.5 18.0 20.8 25.0 24.6 
103 101 97 92 93 
8.2 9.1 10.9 13.8 13.5 
17.7 19.4 22.8 27.8 27.4 
101 99 95 89 89 
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Table 22: Scenario settings for pension calculations. 
Table 23: Combinations of scenario settings for pension calculations. 
Sett i rigs/ 
Domain 
D-Wrephy 
National 1 
(Standard) 
National 2 
( I rmigrat ion)  
Lebor Activi ty 
A c t i v i t y  Benchmark 
Low A c t i v i t y  
Late Retirement 
Permion System 
Pension Benchmark 
Income Deduction 
Burden Sharing 
- with subsidy 
- no d e f i c i t  
If all three measures are applied simultaneously, the impact of demographic aging on the 
pension system is reduced substantially. In the version with subsidy, the maximum of the 
contribution rate in 2030 is reduced to 23-25%, and the pension level amounts to 92-95% 
of its 1985 value. The deficit of the system is raised to about 13% of total expenditure, as 
compared to 10% in 1990. If the deficit is also covered by the contributors and retirees, 
contributions will increase by another 2.5% in the no deficit scenario, and the pension level 
is reduced by another 3%. However, since the present system runs a deficit of about lo%, 
these figures overstate the burden to some extent. 
Pension Scenarios 
Settings/ 
Domain 
D-Wrephy 
National 1 
(Standard) 
National 2 
( I rmigrat ion)  
Lebor Activity 
A c t i v i t y  Benchmark 
Lou A c t i v i t y  
Late Retirement 
Permion System 
Pension Benchmark 
Income Deduction 
Burden Sharing 
- with subsidy 
- no d e f i c i t  
Bench- 
m r k  
II 
C d i n e d  Po l i cy  Pension Scenarios (Burden Sharing) 
I n  
migrat ion 
• 
II 
II 
Burden Sharing wi th Subsidy 
I mane 
Deduction 
II 
II 
II 
Low 
A c t i v i t y  
II 
II 
II 
No D e f i c i t  Burden Sharing 
Bench- 
mark 
II 
¤ 
II 
II 
Bench- 
mark 
II 
II 
• 
II 
Late 
Retirement 
II 
II 
II 
I n -  
Migrat ion 
¤ 
II 
• 
II 
II 
In -  
Migrat ion 
• 
I ¤ 
II 
II 
Lou 
A c t i v i t y  
II 
I 
II 
Burden Sharing 
Lou 
A c t i v i t y  
I 
II 
II 
subsidy 
II 
II 
II 
no 
d e f i c i t  
II 
II 
II 
A comparison for different demographic and behavioral assumptions shows some differences. 
The Low Activity Scenario results in the largest burden, while the Inmigration Scenario gives 
the lowest values. The difference between these two scenarios for the year 2030 is about 
2.3% in the contribution rate and 2% in the pension level. This is still a substantial 
difference. The results for the Pension Benchmark Scenario with a low inmigration and an 
increase in female labor force participation are in between. The most important reason for 
the differences is the different size of the labor force as compared to the number of retirees. 
If a steady and substantial inmigration is assumed, the ratio of contributors to retirees 
becomes more favorable than in a scenario with no inmigration, except persons of German 
origin, and a low female labor force participation. 
In general, the effects of demographic aging can be offset to some extent by a higher labor 
force participation and additional inmigration. However, a condition for such a policy is that 
the additional labor force is gainfully employed. Thus problems on the labor market and also 
general political problems created by a constant inflow of a large number of immigrants may 
set a limit to such a simple straightforward policy. 
But even if less favorable assumptions are made for the labor force, the negative impact of 
demographic aging on the pension system is still reduced substantially by suitable policy 
measures. In the Low Activity Scenario, the contribution rate must be raised by about one 
half, and pensions must be reduced by about 10% in the long run to balance the system. Such 
adaptation appears to be feasible, especially if future economic growth is considered: even 
if a moderate growth rate of real income is assumed, such a solution would only imply 
smaller increases of pensions and net earnings, as compared to the growth rate of gross 
earnings, but no reductions in real income. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The study gives some additional proof that, for a rather wide range of possible assumptions, 
further aging of the German population is certain. The German unification, which adds the 
somehow younger but smaller East German population to the older but larger West German 
population, will not change the general trend of aging. 
Aging implies--in a rough definition--significant changes towards the higher proportion of 
older people on total population. Consideration of marital statuses show that aging comes 
together with important changes in the marital composition of the elderly. The calculations 
made give some evidence that in the next decades the proportion of non-married will 
increase, especially for males. 
The aging process as described in the study will result in some serious challenges to the 
pension system. Extrapolating the current settings, the contribution rate will rise, or the 
benefits will fall, or both. It is one of the striking results of the study that there is no 
demographic solution to the pension problem. Even with strong inmigration or replacement 
level fertility, the general problem of maintaining the pension system is not solved. It should 
be mentioned, however, that in the mid-term, the strong inmigration or replacement fertility 
can help to relax the problems of the pension system. 
On the other hand, there is a bundle of different policy measures to counteract the 
implications of population aging. Our scenario based calculations point out that a combination 
of different measures will perform best: higher female labor force participation, income 
deduction, and burden sharing can reduce the expected deficit of the pension fund. However, 
almost all of the proposed measures need a consensus across the society. 
While aging is certain, the extent of aging may vary in a somewhat narrow range. One of 
the most important implications of population aging will be the change in the ratio 
contributors1beneficiaries of the pension systems, demanding changes in the institutional 
settings (pension systems, general tax system), andlor behavioral components and 
expectations (economic activity, income level). 
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